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R. v. K.R.J.: The Refined Approach
to Punishment in Section 11
of the Charter
Stacey D. Young*

Abstract
In R. v. K.R.J.1 (“K.R.J.”) the Supreme Court acknowledged what is
intuitive but was not explicit in section 11(i) Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms2 (“Charter”) jurisprudence: determining if something is
punishment requires consideration of the impact it has on an offender.
The critical question in K.R.J. was whether a section 161 Criminal Code3
(“Code”) prohibition order constituted punishment within the meaning of
section 11(i) of the Charter. Section 161(1) orders restrict the liberty
interest of convicted sexual offenders who pose an ongoing risk of
committing a sexual offence against a child. These orders restrict the
ability of offenders to attend places where children are present, or have
unsupervised contact with children, in person or through electronic
means. The provisions are intended to protect children from abuse by
repeat offenders. In K.R.J. the Supreme Court of Canada found the
consequences of a sanction on the offender need to be considered in
order to give a purposive interpretation to the Charter protection when
determining whether a sanction amounts to punishment. In other words,
it is not just the reason why a sanction is imposed that matters, its impact
is also important. Both purpose and effect must be considered. This
modified the previous test. In carving out “a clearer and more meaningful
role for the consideration of the impact of a sanction” the court continued
the trend towards greater acknowledgement of the consequences on an
*
Deputy Director, Crown Law Office – Criminal, Ministry of the Attorney General. The
views expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the position of the ministry.
1
[2016] S.C.J. No. 31, 2016 SCC 31 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “K.R.J.”].
2
The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[hereinafter “Charter”].
3
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter the “Code”].
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offender. The reformulation of the test invites further litigation and has
the potential to affect all manner of ancillary orders. For example, while
orders for forfeiture or fine in lieu of forfeiture for proceeds of crime are
not likely to be affected, forfeiture of offence-related property may now
qualify as punishment.

I. INTRODUCTION
Part XXIII of the Code4 outlines the purposes and principles of
sentencing, and the basis of punishment.5 The fundamental purpose of
sentencing is to “protect society and to contribute ... to respect for the
law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing
just sanctions...” that have one of the enumerated objectives.6 The imposition
of sanctions post-conviction is intended to protect the public and promote
respect for the law by redressing the harm done to society by the offence.
While the majority of available sanctions are set out in this Part of the
Code, there has been a proliferation of ancillary orders that appear
elsewhere in the Code that are imposed following a finding of guilt, and
that may constitute “punishment”. This includes sections 109 and 110
weapon prohibitions; section 161(1) prohibition orders for child sexual
offenders; section 259 driving prohibitions; section 380.2(1) prohibition
orders dealing with certain types of property; section 446(5) prohibition
orders involving custody or control of an animal; DNA orders under
sections 487.04 and 487.051; orders under the Sex Offender Information
Registration Act pursuant to section 490.012; prohibition orders under
Part XX.1 (mental disorder dispositions); forfeiture or fine in lieu of
forfeiture for proceeds of crime (sections 462.37(1) or 462.37(3)) or
forfeiture of offence-related property (section 490.1(1)). These orders
impact an offender but if they do not constitute “punishment” they do not
attract the protections set out in subsections 11(i) or (h) of the Charter.7
4

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended.
Bill C-41, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in
consequence thereof, S.C., 1995, c. 22 came into effect in 1996.
6
The objectives of sentencing include denunciation, deterrence, separation from society
(when necessary), rehabilitation, providing reparations, and promoting responsibility. See subss.
718(a-f). See also ss. 718.01, 718.1, 718.2 and related case law on the principles of sentencing.
7
Section 12 is broader and protects against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.
Provisions that do not constitute punishment may be captured under s. 12 as treatment, see R. v.
Rodgers, infra, note 8, at para. 63. The Court of Appeal for Ontario recently declined to determine
whether the test for punishment under s. 11(i) of the Charter also applies in the s. 12 context: R. v.
Tinker, [2017] O.J. No. 3435, 2017 ONCA 552, at para. 125 (Ont. C.A.).
5
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K.R.J. refined the test for determining what constitutes punishment in
a Charter context. The explicit acknowledgement of the need to consider
the effect of a sanction will serve as a check on the retrospective
application of legislation and increase the protection of the rights of an
accused. To appreciate the impact of the decision, it is first necessary to
understand the constitutional context and development of the case law.

II. SECTION 11 OF THE CHARTER: PUNISHMENT RELATED
PROTECTIONS
Section 11(i) of the Charter provides that any person charged with an
offence has the right, “if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment
for the offence has been varied between the time of commission and the
time of sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser punishment”. This section
expresses society’s repudiation of retrospective punishment. This is an
aspect of the Rule of Law.8 Citizens should know prior to committing an
offence that the act is contrary to the law, and the possible punishment for
breaking the law, so that knowledge guides their behaviour.9
Section 11(h) provides that any person charged with an offence has
the right, “if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again
and, if finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried or
punished for it again”. This is directed at preventing the State from
making repeated attempts to convict an individual.10 This provision often
involves consideration of criminal proceedings, and subsequent
regulatory or quasi-criminal proceedings, and whether those proceedings
amount to a trial for the same offence.
Although these provisions are aimed at different rights, fairness in
punishment informs both these provisions and supports a harmonious
approach.11

8
Ben Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing,
2008), at 27-42.
9
Charles Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), at 77-101.
10
R. v. Shubley, [1990] S.C.J. No. 1, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
11
K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 39.
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III. THE TEST FOR PUNISHMENT IN R. V. RODGERS12
Prior to K.R.J., R. v. Rodgers was the governing authority for determining
whether a discrete sanction or consequence of conviction amounted to
“punishment” for the purpose of section 11(i) of the Charter. Rodgers dealt
with DNA databank orders. The Code set out a process that permitted
judicial authorization to seize DNA samples for the data bank. Taking
samples was authorized for offenders who committed a designated offence
after the DNA Identification Act came into force; those who committed an
offence before the Act was proclaimed but were still before the Court; and,
for three classes of offenders who were convicted and sentenced prior to the
Act being proclaimed. Rodgers was a challenge to the latter. Section 487.055
permitted a provincial court judge on an ex parte application to authorize
the collection of DNA samples for dangerous offenders; offenders convicted
of more than one murder; and persons convicted of “more than one
sexual offence” and who, on the date of the application, were still serving
a sentence of imprisonment of at least two years for one or more of those
offences. Mr. Rodgers was a repeat sexual offender caught by this
provision.13
This case was ultimately considered by the Supreme Court and the
Court dismissed constitutional challenges on the basis of sections 7, 8,
11(h) and 11(i). In finding there was no violation of section 11(i) of the
Charter, the Court examined what constituted punishment.
Speaking for the majority, Charron J. explained that “punishment”
refers to the arsenal of sanctions that may be imposed upon conviction
and that the word “sentence” and “sanction” can be used interchangeably.
However, for the purpose of section 11 of the Charter, punishment does
not necessarily encompass every potential consequence of being convicted
of an offence. A “consequence will constitute a punishment when it
forms part of the arsenal of sanctions to which an accused may be liable
in respect of a particular offence and the sanction is one imposed in
furtherance of the purpose and principles of sentencing”. The first branch
of the test focuses on whether the sanction shares the characteristics
of punitive sanctions common to the traditional forms of punishment
provided for in the Code. The second branch of the test focuses on whether
the sanction furthers the traditional purpose and principles of sentencing
(i.e., the reason the sanction was imposed).
12
13

R. v. Rodgers, [2006] S.C.J. No. 15, 2006 SCC 15 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodgers”].
Rodgers, id., at para. 2.
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There was no mention of the effect of a sanction on an offender in the
framework set out in Rodgers. In that context, it was unnecessary to
develop the test further as the DNA sampling was not part of the “arsenal
of sanctions to which an accused may be liable in respect of a particular
offence”. Nonetheless this omission was notable given the traditional
consideration of both the purpose and effect in Charter analysis.

IV. FORESHADOWING OF A NEW TEST: WHALING AND
SECTION 11(H)
The Supreme Court’s next substantive consideration of punishment in
the context of section 11 of the Charter occurred in Canada (Attorney
General) v. Whaling14 (“Whaling”). This case involved three challenges
to the Abolition of Early Parole Act,15 the abolishment of accelerated
parole review (“APR”) and whether that constituted double punishment
contrary to the Charter. The Act eliminated accelerated parole review and
applied retrospectively. The effect of this legislation was to change the
parole eligibility dates from those in place at the time eligible offenders
were sentenced. Where some offenders were formerly eligible after
serving one-sixth of the sentence or six months, they were now only
eligible for parole six months before the full parole eligibility date. The
loss of APR was neither a second proceeding nor a “sanction” in the
sense contemplated by Rodgers, and therefore the analytical framework
set out in Rodgers could not be applied.
To assess whether retrospective changes to the conditions of an
original sanction constitute punishment, the court looked at: (1) whether
the purpose of the law was to retrospectively prolong punishment, and
(2) whether the effect of the law thwarted a settled expectation of liberty
under the former law. In Whaling, abolishing the APR had the effect of
extending an offender’s term of imprisonment, contrary to their “settled
expectation” when they were sentenced.
Articulated as thwarting “an offender’s settled expectation of liberty”,
the practical impact of the Act was to extend an offender’s term of
incarceration.16 Whaling signalled an acknowledgement by the Court that
14
Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling, [2014] S.C.J. No. 20, 2014 SCC 20, at paras. 50-53
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Whaling”].
15
S.C. 2011, c. 11.
16
Consideration of the effect of a measure on an offender may also be seen outside the
Charter context, for example as seen in the Court’s consideration of collateral consequences at
sentence. In R. v. Pham, [2013] S.C.J. No. 100, 2013 SCC 15 (S.C.C.), the Court reduced the
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determining what constitutes punishment requires consideration of the
impact on the offender.

V. THE NEW TEST FOR PUNISHMENT IN K.R.J.
K.R.J. presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to refine the test
set out in Rodgers. Given the decision in Whaling, it is not surprising that the
court expanded the considerations for determining what is punishment, and
harmonized the approach in sections 11(i) and (h) of the Charter.
The accused in K.R.J. entered a guilty plea to charges of incest and
making child pornography. Most of these offences were committed
against his biological daughter between 2008 and 2011. The investigation
originated with an anonymous informant providing a computer that
allegedly belonged to the accused. When the RCMP arrested the accused
they discovered electronic equipment, pornographic DVDs and journals.
Thirteen disks of child pornography were found hidden in the ceiling
of his kitchen. At the time of arrest the accused had sole custody of
the children.17 K.R.J. was sentenced to six years for incest and three years
consecutive for making child pornography (minus credit for pre-sentence
custody). At sentencing the Crown sought a section 161(1) prohibition
order.
The scope of section 161(1) prohibition orders was enlarged in 2012
by the Safe Streets and Communities Act.18 This Act came into force post
offence in K.R.J., but pre-sentence. The Act was intended to be applied
retrospectively. The new provisions provided:
161. (1) When an offender is convicted, or is discharged on the
conditions prescribed in a probation order under s. 730, of an offence
referred to in subsection (1.1) in respect of a person who is under
the age of 16 years, the court that sentences the offender or directs that
sentence of an offender from two years’ imprisonment for production of marijuana and possession
for the purposes of trafficking to two years less a day. This avoided the loss of a right to appeal a
removal order under the Immigration and Refuge Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 64. Although
this was a collateral consequence arising outside of the sentencing context, a sentencing judge may
take this impact into account when exercising his or her discretion in imposing an appropriate
sentence, as long as “the sentence that is ultimately imposed is proportionate to the gravity of
the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”. See also R. v. Wong, [2016] B.C.J.
No. 2215, 2016 BCCA 416 (B.C.C.A.); leave granted [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 557 (S.C.C.).
17
Shortly after the accused and his wife separated, his wife moved to Ontario with the
children, but within a week the children were removed from her care. The accused ultimately made
an application for custody, becoming the sole caregiver for the victim and her brother.
18
S.C. 2012, c. 1.
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the accused be discharged, as the case may be, in addition to any other
punishment that may be imposed for that offence or any other condition
prescribed in the order of discharge, shall consider making and may
make, subject to the conditions or exemptions that the court directs, an
order prohibiting the offender from
(a) attending a public park or public swimming area where persons
under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected
to be present, or a daycare centre, schoolground, playground or
community centre;
(a.1) being within two kilometres, or any other distance specified in the
order, of any dwelling-house where the victim identified in the
order ordinarily resides or of any other place specified in the order;
(b) seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment, whether or not
the employment is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer
in a capacity, that involves being in a position of trust or authority
towards persons under the age of 16 years;
(c) having any contact — including communicating by any means —
with a person who is under the age of 16 years, unless the offender
does so under the supervision of a person whom the court
considers appropriate; or
(d) using the Internet or other digital network, unless the offender does
so in accordance with conditions set by the court.
(emphasis added)

Prior to the 2012 amendments, section 161(1)(c) only prohibited “using a
computer system within the meaning of subsection 342.1(2) for the purpose
of communicating with a person under the age of 16 years” and there was no
general prohibition against using the Internet. In light of the change in the
provision, the sentencing judge declined to impose a section 161(1) order
under the new provisions, but imposed restrictions based on the version of
section 161(1) that was in force at the time of the offence.
The appellant appealed his sentence to the British Columbia Court of
Appeal, and the Crown cross-appealed the finding that the amendments
to section 161 did not apply retrospectively. The appellant/respondent on
the cross-appeal argued that the retrospective application of the provision
offended section 11(i) of the Charter. The Court of Appeal upheld the
sentence (although it adjusted pre-custody credit), and also allowed the
Crown appeal. The amendments to section 161(1) of the Code were
intended to apply retrospectively. Further, the majority of the Court of
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Appeal found that the subsections did not constitute ‘punishment’ and
accordingly their retrospective application did not offend section 11(i) of
the Charter.
A different conclusion had been reached by the Court of Appeal for
Nova Scotia.19 It is therefore unsurprising that the Supreme Court
granted leave to appeal in K.R.J. and stated two constitutional questions:
Does the retrospective operation of subsections 161(1)(c) and (d) of the
Code, as enacted by section 16 of the Safe Streets and Communities Act,
infringe section 11(i) of the Charter? If so, is the infringement a
reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society under section 1 of the Charter?
A unanimous court found that the test under section 11(i) had to be
clarified: yet the Court split on the application of the new test to the
provisions. The framework in Rodgers did not provide sufficient
guidance to determine what constitutes punishment. The purpose of
enhancing public protection underlines all aspects of criminal law, while
punishment has the effect of restricting an offender’s liberty. Both
purpose and effect must be considered to determine what amounts to
punishment. Accordingly, the Court added a third component to the
Rodgers test:
[41] … I would restate the test for punishment as follows in order to
carve out a clearer and more meaningful role for the consideration of
the impact of a sanction: a measure constitutes punishment if (1) it is a
consequence of conviction that forms part of the arsenal of sanctions to
which an accused may be liable in respect of a particular offence, and
either (2) it is imposed in furtherance of the purpose and principles of
sentencing, or (3) it has a significant impact on an offender’s liberty or
security interests.

The requirement of a “significant impact” in the third prong of the test
necessarily involves a qualitative assessment of the impact on an offender.
This was in keeping with the comment of the Court in Rodgers that not
every potential consequence of conviction will constitute punishment.20
Some weighty interference with a liberty interest is required, otherwise even
the most minor consequence would amount to punishment.21 This prong of
the test requires a significant constraint on a person’s ability to engage in
19

R. v. Farler, [2013] N.S.J. No. 41, 2013 NSCA 13 (N.S.C.A.).
Rodgers, supra, note 16, at para. 63.
21
The Charter protects against state action that is significant: Cunningham v. Canada,
[1993] S.C.J. No. 47, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.).
20
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otherwise lawful conduct or impose significant burdens not imposed on
other people.22 The Court cited with approval the approach of Doherty J. in
R. v. Hooyer,23 in determining what constitutes a “significant impact”:24
… [A] prohibition that significantly limits the lawful activities in which
an accused can engage, where an accused can go, or with whom an
accused can communicate or associate, would sufficiently impair the
liberty and security of the accused to warrant characterizing the
prohibition as punishment.25

Both of the amendments in section 161(1)(c) and (d), could have a
significant impact on the liberty and security of offenders. Living under
restrictions in the community attracts stigma and the prohibitions have
the potential to impact employment, as well as the ability to interact with
people in both public and private spaces.
The 2012 amendments to section 161(1) constitute punishment. They (1)
were a consequence of conviction that formed part of the arsenal of
sanctions to which an accused may be liable in respect of an offence, (2)
were imposed in furtherance of the purpose and principles of sentencing, and
(3) had a significant impact on an offender’s liberty and security interests.26
22

K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 42.
R. v. Hooyer, [2016] O.J. No. 280, 2016 ONCA 44 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Hooyer”].
24
The appellant in Hooyer was convicted of one count of fraud contrary to s. 380 and
one count of theft contrary to s. 331. An elderly man was in a long-care facility with dementia
when his wife passed away. The appellant was like an adopted son and assumed power of
attorney. Over the course of several years the appellant converted the bulk of the money he held
in trust to his own use, neglecting the payment of the victim’s expenses and depleting the estate.
He also diverted money for health expenses that was payable by Veterans Affairs to the nursing
home to his own use. At sentencing, the trial judge made a s. 380.2(1) order prohibiting the
appellant from ever seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment or becoming a volunteer
in any capacity that would involve authority over the real property, money or valuable security
of another person. On appeal Hooyer alleged a violation of s. 11(i) of the Charter but withdrew
that argument when it became clear that proper notice had not been provided. Instead, counsel
framed the issue as one of statutory interpretation. Counsel argued s. 380.2(1) came into force in
November 2011 (S.C. 2011, c. 6, s. 4) several months after the fraud on Veterans Affairs. The
s. 380.2(1) prohibition constituted punishment and under the prevailing rules of statutory
interpretation should be applied prospectively only, absent a clear indication that Parliament
intended it to be applied retrospectively. The Court agreed. The s. 380.2(1) order prohibited a
“wide variety of otherwise lawful activities. These included many forms of employment. The
prohibition could well significantly negatively affect the appellant’s ability to find and maintain
employment and fully participate within his community”. This meaningfully restricted the
liberty interest of the accused and amounted to punishment even though the purpose was to
protect the public.
25
Hooyer, id., at para. 42.
26
It would have been sufficient to satisfy either of the latter two criteria, but both were
satisfied in this case.
23
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1. Retrospective Application of Punishment is Allowable: Section 1
Analysis
Having found that the provisions in subsections 161(1)(c) and (d)
constituted punishment, the Court went on to consider whether the
provision could nonetheless be saved as a reasonable limit that was
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under section 1 of
the Charter.
The objective of the infringing measure was “to better protect children
from the risks posed by offenders like the appellant who committed their
offences before, but were sentenced after, the amendments came into
force”.27 There was no real debate that the legislative intent was pressing
and substantial; the issue was whether the retrospective application
satisfied the proportionality requirements.28 The Court split on whether the
deleterious effects of the violation outweighed the objective.29
According to the majority, the need for the retrospective application
of the prohibitions in section 161(1)(d) was more compelling than for
section 161(1)(c). Section 161(1)(d) was enacted to address an emerging
threat and close a legislative gap.
The rate of technological change over the past decade has fundamentally
altered the social context in which sexual crimes can occur. Social
media websites (like Facebook and Twitter), dating applications (like
Tinder), and photo-sharing services (like Instagram and Snapchat) were
all founded after 2002, the last time prior to the 2012 amendments that
substantial revisions to s. 161(1) were made. These new online services
have given young people — who are often early adopters of new
technologies — unprecedented access to digital communities. At the
same time, sexual offenders have been given unprecedented access to
potential victims and avenues to facilitate sexual offending.30

The previous provision was focused solely on using a computer system to
communicate with a person under the age of 16. The new, broader provision
expanded the means of communication so it covered all forms of technology
27

K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 65. Conversely, Brown J. considered the amendments as a
whole, as opposed to their retrospectively (para. 137). As Justice Brown was alone in his approach to
this issue, it is unlikely that this will be adopted in other cases.
28
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
29
Writing on behalf of seven members of the Court, Karakatsanis J. found s. 161(1)(d) was
justified under s. 1, but s. 161(1)(c) was not. Justice Brown would have upheld the retrospective
application of both subsections, and Abella J. would not have permitted either subsection to be
applied retrospectively.
30
K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 102.
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that were being used to access children including email, smartphones, the
Internet and any other digital network.31 It also encompassed a broader range
of behaviour that presented a risk to children.32
This was a “compelling temporal reason”, and the need to respond to an
emerging threat did not undermine the fairness of the legal system or offend
the rule of law to the same degree, since Parliament was closing a
legislative gap.33 The deleterious effects of the retrospective application of
this subsection were attenuated by this rapidly changing social context.
Conversely, there was no such temporal justification for the addition
of a prohibition against having any contact, including communicating by
any means, with a person who is under 16 years of age, as prohibited by
section 161(1)(c). Previously an offender could be prohibited from
attending specified places where children are present, such as a playground
or daycare centre, or could reasonably be expected to be present, like a
public park or swimming area. The prohibition was expanded by the
addition of this subsection to include both public and private spaces,
potentially including an offender’s own home if they have children or
younger family members. There was no evidence to show the previous
sentencing regime was insufficient and therefore no compelling basis to
explain why the new provisions had to be applied retrospectively.

VI. IMPLICATIONS
In contrast to the original test established in Rodgers, the refined test
from K.R.J. represents a less deferential approach to Parliament. It is not
sufficient for the government to retrospectively impose a sanction in the
name of public protection; it must do so in a manner that does not
significantly impact an offender’s liberty or security interests. If it does,
it will be considered punishment and retrospective application will
violate section 11(i) of the Charter.
31
See comments of Ms. Carole Morency, Standing Committee on Justice and Human
Rights Evidence 40th parl., 3rd session, number 45, February 2, 2011, at p. 14; and number 50,
February 28, 2011, at p. 4.
32
This includes preventing: access to child pornography; access to like-minded peers who
might encourage offending or normalize sexual interest in a child; and, access to children through a
third party who might participate or facilitate sexual abuse of children (see for example, Safe Streets
and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1, s. 23, which created s. 172.2 of the Code: the offence of using
telecommunication to agree or arrange to commit a number of sexual offences against a child).
33
K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 110. In contrast, Brown J. considered the temporal issue a
factor to be considered when assessing the pressing and substantial nature of the objective, rather
than the proportionality analysis.
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Explicit acknowledgement of the effect of a sanction on an offender in
the analysis of K.R.J. was both intuitive and predictable following Whaling.
The types of sanctions that are imposed following conviction have
expanded beyond the traditional penal consequences of imprisonment and
fines of a certain magnitude.34 The purpose of these measures alone should
not be determinative of whether they amount to punishment. This is
consistent with the general approach to Charter analysis and will provide
accused persons with increased protection against the retrospective
application of measures that significantly constrain their liberty. While it
was unknown exactly how the court would incorporate effect into the
section 11(i) analysis, it was clear post-Whaling that the Court’s willingness
to consider effect could have implications for numerous sanctions that have
emerged over the last two decades. The expansion of ancillary orders, such
as section 161(1) prohibition orders, made this issue ripe for section 11(i)
constitutional consideration.35
The decision in K.R.J. will undoubtedly usher in more litigation. If a
sanction now amounts to punishment in the context of a section 11
constitutional analysis because of the effect on an offender, some may try
to argue that the sanction should be considered when assessing the
totality and proportionality of the sentence, despite being imposed for a
different purpose. However, this is contrary to developing case law. In
the context of Charter challenges, new and existing ancillary orders will
now be assessed using the K.R.J. framework. The requirement for a
“significant” impact on an offender’s liberty and security interests
provides fertile ground for litigation. It is likely that some orders will
now qualify as ‘punishment’ that would not have satisfied the test in
Rodgers, and those boundaries will no doubt be tested. For example, one
area that has not traditionally been considered punishment is forfeiture or
fine in lieu of forfeiture for proceeds of crime, and the analogous
34

R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] S.C.J. No. 71, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541 (S.C.C.).
Hamish Stewart, in “Punitive in Effect: Reflections on Canada v. Whaling” (2015), 71
S.C.L.R. (2d) 263 correctly noted that Whaling could have implications on a number of
consequences of convictions, such as a victim fine surcharge under s. 737 of the Code, or
registration requirements for sexual offenders. He suggested there is now a strong case to suggest the
registration requirements under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (S.C. 2004, c. 10)
s. 2(1) amount to punishment. This Act imposes an obligation to report annually or upon certain
events. This includes providing: name, date of birth, address, employment details, education
program details, telephone number, physical description, vehicle information, licence number, and
passport number. However, it is unlikely that this will amount to punishment. The reporting
requirement will likely not amount to a ‘significant burden’ as defined by K.R.J. It does not
significantly limit the offender’s lawful activities, movement or communication; it only requires the
offender to provide information about himself and his activities. K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 42.
35
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forfeiture order for offence-related property. Under the K.R.J. analysis,
forfeiture of offence related property may now qualify as punishment. It
constrains lawful conduct by removing a person’s existing rights to use
and dispose of their property. This can be distinguished from forfeiture of
proceeds of crime which seeks to remove the benefit of an illegal activity
and does not constrain lawful conduct.
1. Forfeiture — Proceeds of Crime and Offence-Related Property
Part XX.2 of the Code deals with proceeds of crime and authorizes its
forfeiture or a fine in lieu of forfeiture in certain circumstances.36 While
orders under this section are considered part of the sentence for the
purposes of an appeal,37 the Court of Appeal for Ontario has said these
orders do not constitute punishment.38 Although these cases did not arise
in a constitutional context, the approach of the courts was consistent with
the approach in Rodgers.

36

Section 462.37 provides in part:
(1) Subject to this section and sections 462.39 to 462.41, where an offender is convicted,
or discharged under section 730, of a designated offence and the court imposing sentence
on the offender, on application of the Attorney General, is satisfied, on a balance of
probabilities, that any property is proceeds of crime and that the designated offence was
committed in relation to that property, the court shall order that the property be forfeited
to Her Majesty to be disposed of as the Attorney General directs or otherwise dealt with
in accordance with the law.
…
(3) If a court is satisfied that an order of forfeiture under subsection (1) or (2.01) should
be made in respect of any property of an offender but that the property or any part of or
interest in the property cannot be made subject to an order, the court may, instead of
ordering the property or any part of or interest in the property to be forfeited, order the
offender to pay a fine in an amount equal to the value of the property or the part of or
interest in the property. In particular, a court may order the offender to pay a fine if the
property or any part of or interest in the property
(a) cannot, on the exercise of due diligence, be located;
(b) has been transferred to a third party;
(c) is located outside Canada;
(d) has been substantially diminished in value or rendered worthless; or
(e) has been commingled with other property that cannot be divided without
difficulty.
(emphasis added)
37
Section 673 of the Code.
38
The possibility of incarceration that may result from non-payment of a fine in lieu of
forfeiture pursuant to s. 743.7 of the Code does not change the nature of the order. Section 743.7 is
an enforcement provision and is not punishment: R. v. Wu, [2003] S.C.J. No. 78, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 530
(S.C.C.); R. v. Bourque, [2005] O.J. No. 591, at para. 20 (Ont. C.A.).
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While the intention of the general sentencing provisions is to “punish an
offender for committing a particular offence”, the purpose of forfeiture in
Part XII.2 is to “deprive the offender and the criminal organization of the
proceeds of their crime and to deter them from committing crimes in the
future”.39 Such an order is part of the sentence, but it is nevertheless
distinguished by the fact that its purpose is to remove the proceeds of crime.
It is not punishment specifically for the designated offence, but in addition
to the sentence imposed for the offence.40
In R. v. Lavigne, Deschamps J. writing for the Court, considered whether
the ability of an offender to pay is relevant when imposing a fine in lieu of
forfeiture.41 The offender was part of a cannabis trafficking ring. He entered
a guilty plea to conspiring to produce and traffic in cannabis, possess
cannabis for the purposes of trafficking and possess property derived
from trafficking in cannabis, and committing indictable offences for the
benefit of a criminal organization (sections 465 and 467.12 of the Code
respectively). In addition to a custodial period, the Crown sought an order
for a fine in lieu of forfeiture pursuant to section 462.37(3). The trial judge
determined that the offender had received at least $150,000 from his
offences, but by the time of sentence he had disposed of the money. The
trial judge imposed a sentence equivalent to 50 months’ imprisonment, and
a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $20,000. This was less than the amount of the
proceeds, but what the trial judge felt was appropriate in light of the
inability of the offender to pay the full amount. Ultimately, the Supreme
Court was called upon to consider whether the ability to pay is a proper
consideration for a fine in lieu of forfeiture, as it would be for a fine
imposed under section 734(2) of the Code.
The Court found that ability to pay had no place in consideration of the
quantum of the fine in lieu of forfeiture, but it was relevant to the amount of
time the offender should be given to pay. This decision was based on the
reason the order was imposed — removing the benefit of the crime.
The amicus curiae argues that the effect of imposing a fine without
regard to the general principles of sentencing is to punish the
offender twice. What that argument fails to consider is that those
principles are not all disregarded and that a fine instead of forfeiture
is seen as a separate component of the sentence. While such an order

39

R. v. Lavigne, [2006] S.C.J. No. 10, 2006 SCC 10, at paras. 9, 16, 30 (S.C.C.).
Lavigne, supra, note 43, at paras. 25, 33.
41
The offender did not participate in the appeal and amicus curiae was appointed to
assist the court.
40
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is technically part of the sentence, it is nevertheless distinguished by
the fact that its purpose is to replace the proceeds of crime. It is not
regarded as punishment specifically for the designated offence.42

Although Lavigne was released prior to Rodgers, it was heard while
Rodgers was on reserve and reflects the focus on the purpose for
imposing an order. A forfeiture order is imposed to remove the financial
benefit to the offender or criminal organization. Although it has a
deterrent effect, not all sanctions with a deterrent effect are punishment:
the measure must be imposed in furtherance of the purpose and
principles of sentencing.
Another similar forfeiture order exists for offence-related property,43
and there is mounting tension between purpose and effect for this
sanction, albeit not in a Charter context.44 In R. v. Craig45 the offender
entered a guilty plea to producing marijuana contrary to section 7(1) of
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“CDSA”).46 This production
occurred in the offender’s home and the Crown brought an application
for forfeiture of offence-related real property — the offender’s home —
under the CDSA. Justice Abella for the majority made it clear that the
considerations at play for a forfeiture order were distinct from the
principles of sentencing.47 While the majority acknowledged forfeiture
orders for offence-related property may have a punitive impact on an
offender48 that was not the purpose of the order. “The sentencing inquiry
focuses on the individualized circumstances of the offender; the main
focus of forfeiture orders, on the other hand, is on the property itself and
its role in past and future crime”.49

42

Lavigne, supra, note 43, at paras. 10, 16, 25.
Offence-related property includes any property that is used in connection with or
intended to be used in connection with the commission of an indictable offence under the Code or a
designated offence under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
44
There is a distinction between establishing that something is punishment for the
purposes of a s. 11 Charter analysis, and determining whether the sentencing principles set out
in ss. 718.1 and 718.2 of the Code are engaged. For example, a court may impose an ancillary
order but not factor the order into a totality assessment if the purpose of the order is not to
punish the offender.
45
[2009] S.C.J. No. 23, 2009 SCC 23 (S.C.C.).
46
S.C. 1996, c. 19.
47
Craig, supra, note 49, at para. 13. Note that Justice Abella specifically commented that
the appeal was not based on a constitutional challenge to the forfeiture provisions.
48
Craig, id., at paras. 22 and 34.
49
Craig, id., at para. 40.
43
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In contrast, LeBel and Fish JJ. found that forfeiture of offence-related
property may have a punitive effect on an offender and should be taken
into account when considering the global sentence.50 Justice Fish focused
on how the offender legally obtained the property but the assets were
subsequently caught by the forfeiture provisions.51 In that context
forfeiture would be “unmistakably punitive in effect”.52
Since the release of K.R.J. the Supreme Court has not directly dealt with
the issue of whether a proceeds of crime forfeiture order, or order for a fine
in lieu of forfeiture, amount to punishment. Shortly after K.R.J. the Court
of Appeal for Ontario commented that these orders do not constitute
punishment, but again, these comments were not made in a Charter context,
and the Court did not consider the impact on an offender.
In R. v. Angelis53 the Crown appealed the failure of a trial judge to
impose a fine in lieu of forfeiture. The offender was an account manager
who committed a five-year fraud against Dayco Canada Corp, his
employer. While on bail he committed three additional book-keeping and
accounting frauds. The offender was sentenced to the equivalent of four
years and three months imprisonment. Restitution orders were made for
the frauds committed while on bail, but no restitution order was made in
favour of Dayco, which had insurance coverage for the loss. The
offender had dissipated his assets and the Crown sought a fine in lieu of
forfeiture for the losses suffered.
On appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the relevance of the
general sentencing principles was again raised. The court looked to the
purpose of the two Parts of the Code. Part XXIII focuses on punishment
of the offender for the crime they committed. Part XII.2 is focused on the
proceeds of crime acquired through the commission of the offence. The
purpose of Part XII.2 is not punishment and the court of appeal noted this
explicitly.54 Accordingly, the purpose and principles of sentencing do not
50

Craig, id., at paras. 89, 93.
Craig, id., at para. 96.
52
Craig, id., at paras. 93 and 100.
53
[2016] O.J. No. 4735, 2016 ONCA 675 (Ont. C.A.); leave refused [2016] S.C.C.A.
No. 484 (S.C.C.).
54
Angelis, id., at paras. 39 and 50; and R. v. Khatchatourov, [2014] O.J. No. 2847, 2014
ONCA 464, at para. 55 (Ont. C.A.). In Khatchatourov, two offenders were convicted of committing
various mortgage financing frauds that preyed upon recent immigrants from Russia and Ukraine
using the newcomers’ identities to fraudulently obtain mortgage financing. The offenders were both
sentenced to four years’ imprisonment and fines in lieu of forfeiture were made pursuant to s. 462.37
of the Code. Restitution orders were also issued to CMHC. The offenders challenged the orders on a
number of grounds, including the imposition of concurrent restitution and fine in lieu of forfeiture
orders.
51
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generally apply to forfeiture orders.55 The trial judge erred in considering
rehabilitation and the general principles of sentencing when determining
whether to grant a fine in lieu of forfeiture. The Court of Appeal imposed
a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of $1,036,750.56
The conclusion that a fine in lieu of forfeiture is not punishment
is consistent with the test in Rodgers, but would it pass the refined test
in K.R.J.?
2. Forfeiture and Fines in Lieu for Proceeds of Crime is not
Punishment
As canvassed above, applying the first two components of the test in
K.R.J. to determine if forfeiture orders qualify as punishment can be
dealt with in short order. First, an order for forfeiture or a fine in lieu of
forfeiture under section 462.37(1) or 462.37(3) is a consequence of
conviction that forms part of the arsenal of sanctions for which an
offender may be liable for an offence.57 Second, these orders are not
imposed in furtherance of the purpose and principles of sentencing.
These orders are imposed to remove the proceeds of crime from
offenders and criminal organizations so they do not profit from their
offences. While forfeiture of proceeds of crime has a deterrent effect, that
is not the focus of these types of orders.58 However, following K.R.J. a
court conducting a section 11 Charter analysis must now go further to
determine whether, regardless of the purpose, the order has a significant
impact on the offender’s liberty or security interests.
These orders do not restrict where an accused can go, or restrict the
accused’s movement in any way. Nor do they impact the ability of an
accused to communicate or associate with anyone. However, an order for
forfeiture or fine in lieu of forfeiture impacts the economic interests of an
accused. Forfeiture interferes with the peaceful enjoyment of the specific
property, and constrains the offender from disposing of the property.
A fine in lieu of forfeiture is a slightly different matter. The accused’s
55

Angelis, id., at para. 56.
See also R. v. Saikaley, [2017] O.J. No. 2377, 2017 ONCA 374, at para. 181 (Ont. C.A.)
that recognizes that a forfeiture order should not be conflated with punishment for the offences
committed and should not be considered when assessing the totality of a sentence.
57
Rodgers, supra, note 16, at para. 63. Note that a court can also order forfeiture without a
conviction pursuant to s. 462.37(2) but that provision is not part of this analysis.
58
Rodgers, supra, note 16, at para. 64; Lavigne, supra, note 43, at para. 25, Craig, supra,
note 44, at para. 40.
56
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economic interests are still engaged, but there are no limitations on how
an accused can deal with specific property. Rather, the accused is under a
general obligation to pay an amount equal to the value of the assets that
would otherwise be forfeited, if the assets were available. Despite these
constraints and interference with economic interests, neither forfeiture
nor a fine in lieu of forfeiture under section 462.37(1) or 462.37(3)
should be considered punishment.
Proceeds of crime include property, and benefits or advantages
obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of the commission of
a designated offence. By definition, an offender is in possession of the
assets as a result of criminal activity. The offender therefore has no preexisting right to the property. It is illegal to possess property obtained by
crime or launder the proceeds of crime.59 Any limitation on the ability to
use or dispose of the property therefore does not constrain otherwise
lawful conduct or lawful activities.
3. Forfeiture of Offence-Related Property may be Punishment
The approach to offence-related property is not as straightforward.
The comments of both Abella J. for the majority, and the minority
judgments of LeBel and Fish JJ. in Craig, acknowledge that these types
of orders impact an offender. Unlike proceeds of crime, it is not illegal to
possess offence-related property.60 It is the use of the property in the
commission of an offence that taints the property and permits forfeiture.
When forfeiture of offence-related property is ordered, the Court is
removing the ability of an offender to deal with their legally-obtained
property. This can have a significant impact on an offender’s interest. It
is also worth noting that an order of forfeiture for offence-related
property engages a proportionality assessment under section 490.41(3).
This permits the court to decline to impose a forfeiture order if the
impact of the order would be disproportionate to “the nature and gravity
of the offence, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
offence and the criminal record, if any, of the person charged with
or convicted of the offence”.61 Thus, while an order for forfeiture of
offence-related property is directed at the property, the provision itself
59

Sections 354(1) and 462.31 of the Code respectively.
Where an item is illegal to possess — such as illicit drugs, credit card skimming devices
or some weapons — those items may be otherwise forfeited.
61
The tailored nature of the order and the built-in proportionality assessment is relevant in
the context of a s. 1 assessment in a Charter challenge.
60
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acknowledges that the order may have a significant impact on an
offender. Under the K.R.J. framework, regardless of purpose, if a
measure has a significant impact on an offender’s liberty or security
interests it will be punishment under section 11(i). Accordingly, the
forfeiture of legally obtained property, such as a home, should be
considered punishment under the third prong of the refined test in K.R.J.
in a Charter analysis.

VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in K.R.J. recognized that determining whether a
sanction constitutes punishment under section 11(i) of the Charter
requires consideration of the effect of a provision on an offender. This
was a predictable result following Whaling, and brings harmony to the
Court’s overall approach to punishment in section 11 of the Charter. This
acknowledgement of the need to consider the effect of a legislative
measure when assessing punishment in a Charter context will provide
greater protection to accused persons and focus attention on the
constraints the legislation seeks to impose on the liberty and security of
an accused. This additional consideration expands what ancillary orders
may amount to punishment. For example, in a Charter context forfeiture
of offence-related property may now be considered punishment. This is
but one example of many ancillary orders available under the Code that
will need to be re-examined through the lens of K.R.J. if applied
retrospectively. We can anticipate further litigation as courts are called
upon to apply this test.

